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Party discipline is controversial. An undisciplined party appears disunited and so unelectable, and 
maverick parliamentarians can claim to be more principled and better represent the wishes of her 
constituents. Yet Kam’s (2009) study of the parliamentary democracies of the UK, Canada and 
Australia highlighted parties increasingly tighten control over their elected members, although 
highlighting members simultaneously feel emboldened to break with discipline. Marland focuses on 
just one of these cases, providing an important fresh look at the issues around party whip systems 
and explores the mechanisms of party discipline and the extent discipline can be enforced in the 
digital age of direct ct communication between represented and representative.  
Marland highlights the public relations problem which Canada’s “most rigid party discipline” (p. 4) 
imposes upon elected representatives. The inability of parliamentarians to speak for citizens if their 
voice contradicts the party line or offer constructive criticism of the executive leads to a democratic 
deficit, citizens feel they lack effective representation and so their trust in democracy processes is 
weakened. Performing the role of maverick means less access to ministers, resources and lower 
chances of advancement. Hence modern parliamentarians find themselves in a lose-lose situation. 
Marland’s work therefore explores the “struggle for an equilibrium between the need for discipline 
in party politics and its suppression of political representation” (p. 5) focusing mainly on the 42nd 
parliament, December 2015-September 2019. The era after Stephen Harper had stamped his 
authority upon the Conservative led coalition 2006-15, a model followed by Justin Trudeau’s 
majority Liberal government. 
The study notes parliamentarians feel pressured to perform the role of local franchise holder, 
performing a uniform service as determined by the national brand. However, not all Canadian 
parliamentarians can follow this model. Backbenchers deal mainly with constituency casework and 
feel unable to simply reiterate the government line. Thus, as in countries with similar political 
systems, those who make policy are brand ambassadors maintaining a distance from citizens, those 
who do not are accessible and engage in asynchronous and synchronous communication with a 
range of citizens they represent. The norms of each role relate to longstanding questions regarding 
who parliamentarians should represent and to whom they owe loyalty (Norton, 2007). Marland’s 
work finds group identity and belonging are significant drivers of conformity. Identifying with the 
wider group, their party, parliamentarians conform to dominant patterns of behaviour, including 
following a shared script. That group norms develop between parliamentarians is an area previously 
unexplored. Parliamentarians are usually viewed as being instrumentalists, seeking promotion or 
electoral benefits. The shared notion a party must appear disciplined in order to maintain public 
support means most parliamentarians, while railing against discipline, also tend to follow the party 
line.  
Marland’s work highlights the broader democratic challenges strict party control causes. 
Parliamentarians face a backlash from media and citizenry when they give incomplete or non-
answers to questions and speak in partisan platitudes. The resulting disaffection leaves a space for 
populists who speak freely, highlighting the increasing distance between the citizen, their direct 
representative and decision making, to win support for their perceived honesty and authenticity. 
Top-down command and control means citizens perceive democracy is limited to the ballot. Spaces 
for open debate, such as Canada’s parliamentary caucuses, are held privately. The points of 
consensus that emerge conceal the pluralism of opinion on key policies. Parliamentarians find the 
consensus position is communicated out via party public relations machines, leaving little 
opportunity for more personal or nuanced messaging without appearing to contradict the party line. 
Hence institutional control mechanisms stifle the agency of the parliamentarian. 
The case studies and vignettes drawn from 131 interviews offer a rich picture of specific incidences 
in Canada and specific insights into Canadian politics. However, the broad findings apply to a 
plethora of parliamentary democracies where there are tensions between the role of the 
parliamentarian as representative of the party or of those who elect them. The main questions 
raised are two-fold. Firstly, can parliamentarians organise and combine forces to challenge party 
control, reasserting their role as representative of the people. Secondly, can the processes and 
institutional norms whereby only candidates most likely to toe the line are selected and party 
control over the collection of data and dissemination of statements be weakened to allow greater 
autonomy. These questions focus on process, but they go to the heart of challenges within many 
parliamentary democracies.  
For citizens to have trust in democratic processes they must feel they will be listened to and that 
their arguments have weight. The representational function of parliamentarians normatively should 
include soliciting and aggregating the views of those they represent, feeding these back into decision 
making as well as feeding forward the outcomes to their constituents. Marland shows the significant 
barriers due to “social conditioning, institutional structures, leader-centric systems, personal 
ambition and communication” (p. 341) hinder the representative bridging the gap between party or 
government and citizen in a way that benefits the health of parliamentary democracy. Marland 
draws on the research to propose systemic reforms, challenging legislators, scrutineers and the 
academic community to consider how to improve democratic process. The work thus is timely, it 
speaks to debates on how to reinvigorate trust in democracies and how to stave off threats posed by 
populists. These two challenges form a nexus that threaten the culture of democracies and thus the 
work is important for informing debates on how the reform of institutional processes can address 
systemic problems which are undermining democratic projects the world over. 
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